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
12 August 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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12 August 1961

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
## DAILY BRIEF




Berlin Refugees: 1,627 East German and East Berlin refugees, including 201 "border crossers" who commute to jobs in West Berlin, registered in West Berlin on 10 August. Of the 201 border crossers, 103 were East Berliners, while 98 were residents of the Zone. No (Chart on reverse of page)

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



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**TOTAL ANNUAL REFUGEE FLOW INTO WEST BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY****WEST BERLIN REFUGEE TOTALS**  
COMPARISON OF 1960 AND 1961 BY WEEKS

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[Redacted]

\*France-Algeria-Tunisia: France announced on 11 August the termination of the unilateral cease-fire it had put into effect in Algeria on 20 May at the start of the Evian negotiations. This move is probably timed to counter an adverse French Army reaction to the government's intention, announced on the same day, to withdraw from Bizerte one of the paratroop regiments sent there last month. The army's loyalty to De Gaulle depends heavily on his not displaying "weakness" in handling either the Bizerte or Algerian situations.

No

PAG leaders have from the beginning characterized the French cease-fire as a propaganda gesture, and will be relieved by its termination. They have been reluctant to declare a cease-fire themselves for fear of disintegrating their forces or revealing a lack of control over them. The end of the cease-fire probably will strengthen the hand of Algerian rebel extremists who argue for stepped-up military operations.

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Japan: Internal security officials are concerned about their ability to protect Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan from possible acts of terrorism during his visit to Japan from 14 to 22 August. Police authorities have no evidence of any organized assassination attempt, but have reports that individual rightists may try to assassinate Mikoyan as well as former Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashi and Liberal-Democratic Diet member Tokuma Utsonomiya, both of whom have been promoting closer relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Agency is mobilizing 7,000 to 8,000 police to provide Mikoyan with maximum protection. Some 1,000 ultrarightists marched on the Soviet Embassy on 11 August to protest the visit, engaging in a minor scuffle with police. There is a likelihood of clashes between rightist and leftist elements during Mikoyan's visit.

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\*Dominican Republic: General Ramfis Trujillo is evidently seeking US approval of a plan to replace President Balaguer with a military junta which would continue the current liberalization program, but at a slower pace. Trujillo informed American

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Consul Hill on 9 August that unrest in the armed forces is now extensive; that the officer corps feels threatened by the regime's democratization process and the accompanying expressions of hostility to the military on the part of the opposition; and that the armed forces are determined to resist, by force if necessary, any threat to their position. Trujillo implied that Balaguer, whom he described as a man of the highest ideals, does not understand or command the respect of the armed forces. The current transitional period is more difficult, according to Ramfis, because it is being implemented through Balaguer. He recalled that after the fall of recent dictators in Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela the transition was effected by military juntas, but in Cuba the disintegration of the military assured Castro's total victory.

(Backup, Page 5)

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## LATE ITEM

\*Argentina: The small group of 50 little-known rebels who tried to promote a revolution on 11 August had no important backing and shortly before dawn were taken into custody without bloodshed. By seizing control of the telephone exchange which controls the radio lines, they were able to broadcast a "revolutionary manifesto" claiming broad support for their "Nationalist Revolutionary Movement." The rebels, reportedly led by an air force officer, said they were anti-Communist and "seeking to bring national unity to a country plagued by economic and industrial unrest." Immediate military and labor reaction supported the government. The important railway unions postponed scheduling a planned strike until the situation clarified. The government--which only recently reduced its special security measures against revolutionary plotting--denounced the action as that of hotheads seeking to lessen the prestige of the country, when an important international conference was underway in Montevideo.

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Dominican Armed Forces Considering Replacement  
Of President Balaguer

General Trujillo's analysis of the sentiment in the armed forces is probably basically accurate. There have been other indications that he has been having difficulty controlling his officers, especially during and after the violence on 4 August when police and army officers were subjected to intense provocation by aroused mobs. The opposition--even the moderate National Civic Union (UCN)--has done nothing to allay military fears, and its campaigning thus far, while emphasizing human rights, has been essentially negative. It has dwelt almost exclusively on the ending of abuses, the removal of the Trujillo family from the country, and the destruction of the official political machine, the Dominican Party. Many opposition elements seem to equate democracy with the complete absence of any police controls and consider the armed forces innately an instrument of tyranny.

The ouster of Balaguer and his replacement by a military junta--even if Trujillo were not a member--would probably reduce the chances for a peaceful transition toward responsible government. The opposition has tasted a degree of freedom, is now for the first time in the open and aware of its very considerable strength, and would almost certainly resist any military takeover as a return to dictatorship. Considerable bloodshed would be almost inevitable. Although the danger of Communist and pro-Castro infiltration of the opposition is clear, the country's professional and business people, who have given very extensive backing to the UCN, would have as much or more to lose from a pro-Castro takeover as the military.

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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